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In the early morning hours of June 20, 2011 
Ryan Dunn was driving his Porsche 911 
GTE up to 140 miles per hour through the 
Pennsylvania countryside. The car careened 
over a guardrail and into a wooded area, 
killing Dunn and a passenger in a fiery 
crash. A toxicology report later determined 
that Dunn’s blood alcohol level was more 
than twice the legal limit. Many observers 
found the accident somewhat unsurprising 
because Dunn was best known for perform-
ing dangerous stunts in the popular Jackass 
television and movie series. As one blogger 
put it: “This is the type of person he was. 
He was a risk-taker”.1 Indeed, the headline 
in the Philadelphia Daily News later read: 
“Dunn deal: Death of a risk-taker.”
The public’s response to the Ryan Dunn 
tragedy illustrates a prevalent belief that 
there are consistent individual differences 
in not only people’s risk-taking behavior but 
also in their underlying appetite for risk. 
Several industries depend on this assump-
tion. For instance, in financial services 
the “suitability doctrine” legally requires 
financial advisors to assess their clients’ 
risk preference before dispensing advice 
(Mundheim, 1965). Likewise, most social–
science disciplines traditionally assume sta-
ble and measurable individual differences 
in risk preference. However, based on our 
reading of the empirical literature, the com-
mon intuition that risk preference is a stable 
disposition may reflect more of an attribu-
tion error than empirical fact.
Four challenges to establishing 
stable risk preFerences
To date, most laboratory measurements of 
risk preference either fail to adequately pre-
dict naturalistic risk-taking or are difficult 
to interpret. A sparse literature in econom-
ics using choices among chance gambles 
has had only modest success predicting 
some forms of naturalistic risk-taking (e.g., 
Barsky et al., 1997; Pennings and Smidts, 
2000; Brown et al., 2006; Jaeger et al., 2010) 
and there are even some published failures 
(Brockhaus, 1980; Dohmen et al., 2005). For 
instance, Dohmen et al. found that willing-
ness to invest in a hypothetical chance lot-
tery predicted some forms of naturalistic 
risk-taking, but just as often yielded null 
effects – and furthermore, was less predic-
tive than a single self-reported measure of 
general risk-propensity. We suspect that 
other failed studies have landed in file 
drawers. Even careful attempts to measure 
parameters of prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992), the leading behavioral model of deci-
sion under risk, have yielded disappointing 
results, both in terms of test–retest reliabil-
ity (Zeisberger et al., 2011) and prediction 
of choices among laboratory-constructed 
investments (Erner et al., 2009).
In contrast to economic measures of 
risk preference, some measures devised by 
clinical psychologists such as the Balloon 
Analog Risk Task (BART) and Iowa gam-
bling task (IGT) have had moderate suc-
cess in predicting naturalistic risk-taking. 
For instance, the BART involves pressing a 
button to insert puffs of air in a visually 
depicted balloon; each puff adds a fixed 
amount of money to an account, but if the 
balloon explodes before the participant 
cashes out, she receives nothing. Risk toler-
ance in these tasks has successfully predicted 
such behaviors as drug use, unprotected sex, 
gambling, and stealing (e.g., Bechara et al., 
2001; Lejuez et al., 2002). Although these 
results are encouraging, such clinical tasks 
are not readily decomposable into basic 
cognitive and economic constructs that 
allow for a clear interpretation of risk pref-
erence (Schonberg et al., 2011).
We suggest that the elusiveness of stable 
and measurable risk preferences arises from 
a variety of conceptual and methodologi-
cal challenges, including: (1) clearly defin-
ing risk and risk-taking; (2) segregating 
risk preference from other contributors to 
risk-taking; (3) differentiating risk prefer-
ence from related traits; and (4) accounting 
for situational influences on risk preference.
challenge 1: DeFining risk anD risk-
taking
A first challenge in identifying stable risk 
preferences is that different disciplines 
define risk – and therefore risk-taking – in 
different ways. The economics and finance 
literatures usually define risk in terms of 
variance in the probability distribution over 
possible outcomes (e.g., Markowitz, 1952). 
Thus, for economists, risk-seeking means 
a preference for a higher-variance payoff, 
holding expected value constant. In con-
trast, when clinicians and laypeople identify 
behaviors as “risky,” they invoke a broader 
meaning of the term. Behaviors such as drug 
use, drunk driving, stealing, unprotected 
sex, and hang gliding are often thought of 
as risky because such behaviors can result 
in loss or harm to oneself or others (e.g., 
Furby and Beyth-Marom, 1992). Likewise, 
interviews with experienced managers sug-
gest that they also construe risk in terms 
of exposure to possible negative outcomes, 
rather than variance over outcomes or some 
other quantifiable construct (March and 
Shapira, 1987). Psychometric studies have 
further found that that the lay conception 
of riskiness encompasses a dread dimension 
characterized by lack of control or potential 
catastrophic consequences, and an unknown 
dimension characterized by unobservable, 
unknown, or delayed consequences (Slovic, 
1987). We note that an advantage of the eco-
nomic conception of risk is that it is simple 
and easy to parameterize; a disadvantage is 
that it does not appear to coincide with natu-
ral intuitions of most risk-takers.
challenge 2: Distiling risk preFerence
Even if one accepts a particular definition of 
risk, another challenge is distinguishing risk 
preference from other direct contributors 
to risk-taking. A person may take on more 
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Keltner, 2001), level of arousal (Mano, 1994; 
Knutson et al., 2008), motivational state 
(e.g., aspirational versus protective focus; 
Scholer et al., 2010), feelings of security 
(Levav and Argo, 2010), and momentarily-
activated identities (Morris et al., 2008).
some reasons For optimism
Despite these substantial challenges, there 
are reasons to believe that researchers may 
establish relatively stable risk preferences 
– or at least reasonably good prediction of 
future risk-taking – in the years to come.
First, risk preferences elicited using 
chance gambles show systematic differ-
ences across demographic groups such as 
age, gender, and race (e.g., Barsky et al., 
1997; Byrnes et al., 1999; Donkers et al., 
2001), suggesting cultural and/or biologi-
cal antecedents. Indeed, there appear to be 
genetic correlates of risk preference. For 
example, there is greater convergence in 
economic risk preferences among identical 
twins than fraternal twins raised together, 
accounting for roughly 20% of the vari-
ation in risk-taking behavior (Cesarini 
et al., 2009). Genetic markers related to 
dopamine and serotonin transmission have 
also been linked to economic and financial 
risk preferences in the lab, as have baseline 
levels of testosterone (Dreber et al., 2009; 
Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009; Stanton et al., 
2011).
Second, state variables that influence risk 
preference often have stable dispositional 
counterparts. For instance, in addition to 
the finding that induced anger (fear) leads 
to more (less) risk-seeking, researchers have 
found that chronic levels of anger and fear 
have similar associations with risk-taking 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001).
Finally, it may be that some stable indi-
vidual differences are masked by their pre-
dictable interaction with situation variables. 
For instance, individuals with higher scores 
on the Cognitive Reflection Test tend to be 
more risk-seeking for gains and less risk-
seeking for losses (Frederick, 2005). Better 
characterization of such interactions may 
improve prediction of risk-taking behavior 
(Figner and Weber, 2011).
Where Do We go From here?
To our reading, the elusive search for stable 
risk preferences has found mixed support. 
On one hand, there has been modest success 
identifying predictable differences between 
relationship between risk preference and 
risk-taking. Furthermore, some items in 
these scales explicitly involve naturalistic 
risk-taking or risk preference (e.g., “I think 
I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very 
fast down a high mountain slope” in the 
sensation-seeking scale; “I am a cautious 
person” on the Whiteside and Lynam, 2001 
impulsivity scale). Mapping out these rela-
tionships will be necessary for establishing 
the construct validity of any measure of risk 
preference.
challenge 4: situational inFluences on 
risk preFerence
Even if risk preference can be differentiated 
from related traits, there may be inherent 
limits to the proportion of variance in natu-
ralistic risk-taking that can be explained by 
such a measure. This is because a number 
of situational variables cause even simple 
economic expressions of risk preference to 
fluctuate.
First, risk preferences change systemati-
cally with reference points such as aspira-
tion levels. People tend to be risk-averse for 
gains and risk-seeking for losses of moder-
ate to high probability (the reverse is true for 
low probabilities; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Thus, 
they tend to be more risk-seeking when 
striving to reach a goal (Larrick et al., 2009) 
or avoid losing money (Payne et al., 1980). 
Moreover, past history can influence risk-
taking – for instance people tend to be more 
risk-seeking after experiencing gains (when 
gambling with “house money”; Thaler and 
Johnson, 1990).
Second, risk preferences vary systemati-
cally with normatively irrelevant features of 
the choice environment. Examples include 
whether options are described in terms 
of potential gains or losses (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986), how they are labeled 
(e.g., as an “insurance policy” or “gamble”; 
Hershey et al., 1982), how they are measured 
(e.g., through pricing gambles or choosing 
among them, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; 
Harbaugh et al., 2010), and the nature of 
contrasting risks (e.g., adding a “decoy” 
gamble can increase the attractiveness of 
a dominating gamble; Huber et al., 1982).
Third, risk preferences can fluctuate 
systematically with the decision maker’s 
transitory state of mind. State variables that 
influence risk preferences include specific 
emotions (e.g., anger versus fear; Lerner and 
or less risk than his underlying preference 
would dictate (e.g., climbing a dangerous 
rock face) for a number of reasons. First, 
risk-taking could be a side-effect of pur-
suing an independent goal such as social 
approbation (e.g., responding to peer pres-
sure) or enhancing one’s self-image (e.g., a 
first ascent of a new route). Second, risk per-
ception may drive behavior independently 
of risk preference. For instance, a climber 
may simply underestimate or ignore the 
risk. Indeed, although studies have found 
substantial variation in individual risk- 
taking across life domains, such differences 
can be attributed largely to variation in the 
perceived risks and/or benefits of such 
activities (Weber et al., 2002; Hanoch et al., 
2006). Third, risk-taking behavior could 
reflect a tendency to heavily discount future 
consequences that are accurately perceived 
(e.g., favoring the immediate pleasure of 
smoking over possible long-term health 
consequences).
challenge 3: DiFFerentiating risk 
preFerence
Even if one distinguishes risk preference 
from other direct contributors to risk-
taking, this construct must be differenti-
ated from related traits that also predict 
risk-taking. One trait that has been widely 
linked to risky behavior is sensation-seek-
ing, the need for “varied, novel, complex, 
and intense sensations and experiences, 
and the willingness to take physical, social, 
legal, and financial risks for the sake of such 
experiences”(Zuckerman, 2007, p. 49). As 
this definition makes clear, sensation-seek-
ing involves a tolerance for risk; what is less 
clear is the extent that risk preferences are 
independent of sensation-seeking drives. 
A second related construct is impulsivity, 
marked by tendencies to engage in rash 
action and difficulty in inhibiting impulses 
– not surprisingly, these characteristics 
are also associated with risky behaviors 
(Steinberg et al., 2008). Third, appeti-
tive and inhibitory drives (e.g., as meas-
ured by the BIS/BAS scale of Carver and 
White, 1994) appear to predict risk-taking 
(Demaree et al., 2008). To our reading of the 
literature, the relationships between these 
measures and an underlying appetite for 
risk have not yet been resolved satisfactorily. 
For instance, some of the aforementioned 
constructs may be causal antecedents to 
risk preference; others may moderate the 
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individuals in risk-taking; on the other 
hand, there remain substantial theoretical 
challenges to establishing stable risk pref-
erences. Further research should:(a) define 
risk in a way that is crisp yet resonates with 
lay intuitions, (b) distill risk preference 
from other contributors to risk-taking, (c) 
model the relationship of risk preference to 
related traits, and (d) account for the situ-
ational factors that cause risk preferences 
to fluctuate.
This theoretical work will require inno-
vations in measurement of risk preference. 
Following Schonberg et al. (2011), we 
believe that future measurement paradigms 
must be: (1) predictively valid, (2) readily 
decomposable into basic cognitive and/or 
economic constructs, and (3) dynamic and 
affectively engaging. This work may also 
be supported by brain imaging and other 
physiological measurement methods.
This last criterion merits further com-
ment. Perhaps clinical measures of risk pref-
erence better predict naturalistic risk-taking 
than economic measures because they 
better capture the escalating tension and 
exhilaration that accompany risky pursuits. 
Some researchers have argued that anticipa-
tory emotions are crucial contributors to 
risk-taking, yet have been largely ignored 
by traditional decision-theoretic models 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). Paradigms that 
capture the dynamic and affective nature 
of risk may improve our ability to predict 
risk-taking and help us understand its psy-
chological sources.
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